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Abstract—This paper developed a stochastic programming
model that integrated the most recent regulation rules of the
Spanish peninsular system for bilateral contracts in the day-
ahead optimal bid problem. Our model allows a price-taker
generation company to decide the unit commitment of the
thermal and combined cycle programming units, the economic
dispatch of the BC between all the programming units and the
optimal sale bid by observing the Spanish peninsular regulation.
The model was solved using real data of a typical generation
company and a set of scenarios for the Spanish market price.
The results are reported and analyzed.
Index Terms—Electricity spot-market, short-term electricity
generation planning, combined cycle units, bilateral contracts,
optimal bidding strategies, stochastic programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generation companies in liberalized electricity markets do
not have a load of their own to satisfy, but must bid their hourly
generation to the market operator, who selects the lowest-
price among the biding companies to match the pool load. A
specific generation company (GenCo) expects to have most of
its bids accepted, i.e., have them priced below the market price,
determined hourly by matching the lowest-price bids with the
pool load. Liberalized electricity markets are nowadays very
sophisticated energy- and financial-transaction multimarkets
where, around the main electricity market, the so-called “day-
ahead” or “spot” market, a portfolio of other financial and
physical markets as well as bilateral contracts (BCs) exist.
Moreover, a generation company operating in such a complex
market can no longer optimize its medium- and short-term
generation planning decisions without considering the relation
between those markets and the increasing importance of the
emission-free (wind power and hydro-generation) and low-
emission technologies (combined cycle).
The BCs are agreements between a generation company and
a qualified consumer to provide a given amount of electrical
energy at a stipulated price along with a delivering period. The
characteristics of the BC (energy, price and delivering period)
are negotiated before the day-ahead market, either in organized
or non-organized markets. In the organized BC markets, the
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producers and consumers send sell and purchase bids that are
matched by the market operator. Examples of organized BC
markets are the CESUR [1] and EPE [2] auctions in Spain,
BelpexVPP auctions in Belgium [3], and the EDF’s capacity
auctions in France [4]. In non-organized BC markets, the
producers and consumers agree the amount, price, and period
of the energy delivered, in a private negotiation. In both cases,
from the point of the view of the generation company, a BC
represents a scheduled load curve to be delivered, chargeable
at a fixed price.
Several researchers have proposed optimal bidding models
in the day-ahead market for thermal units under the price-
taker assumption, with or without BC. In [5] the authors
presented a mixed-integer programming model to optimize the
production schedule of a single unit with a simple bidding
strategy. Furthermore, in [6], the approximation of step-wise
bid curves by linear bid functions, based on the marginal
costs was considered, although in a context without BC. Also,
in [7] the concept of price-power function, which is similar
to the matched energy function defined in our study, was
used to derive the optimal bid curves of a hydro-thermal
system. The mixed-integer stochastic programming model [8]
distinguishes the variables corresponding to the bid energy
and those representing the matched energy, though in a price-
maker framework and without BC. In [9] a stochastic unit
commitment problem with BC was solved by maximizing the
day-ahead market benefit. In [10] a mixed-integer stochastic
optimization model for scheduling the thermal units was
presented, and the production plants were optimized in the
presence of stochastic market-clearing prices. Nevertheless,
the two earlier models [9], [10] failed to propose any explicit
modelization of the optimal bid as we have done. Further-
more, the general considerations about the bidding process in
electricity markets can also be obtained [11]–[13].
The combined cycle (CC) units represent the majority of
the new generating unit installations across the globe. In [14]
a method was presented to calculate the unit commitment of
CC units using dynamic programming and lagrangian relax-
ation applied to the security-constrained short-term scheduling
problem. Furthermore, the price-based unit commitment prob-
lem based on the mixed-integer programming method for a
generating company with thermal, CC, cascaded-hydro, and
pumped-storage units has also been presented [15]. None of
the earlier publications presented an explicit formulation of
the optimal sale bid of the CC units to the day-ahead market
or any considerations about the BC.
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Figure 1. Representation of the system under study
Our study developed an stochastic mixed-integer quadratic
programming model for a price-taker GenCo with BC obliga-
tions to determine the optimal bidding strategy of a pool of
thermal and CC programming units in the day-ahead electricity
market. The model was tested with real data of market prices
and programming units of a GenCo operating in the Spanish
electricity market [16].
II. THE STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING MODEL
Fig. 1 represents a price-taker GenCo possessing a set
T of thermal units (coal, nuclear, fuel) and a set C of
CC units represented by the associated set P of equivalent
pseudo-units (combustion turbines and steam turbines, see
section II-A below). Both thermal and CC units bid to the
i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , 24} hourly auctions of the day-ahead
market (left-oriented arrows of Fig. 1). The stochasticity of
the spot price λDi , i ∈ I is represented by a set of S scenarios.
The set BC represents the portfolio of BC duties, with known
energy (LBCij MWh) and price (λ
BC
ij e/MWh) for each BC
contract j ∈ BC and time period i ∈ I, that must be dispatched
between the thermal and CC units (right-oriented arrows of
Fig. 1). The main information provided by the model (here
and now decisions or first-stage variables) for each period,
i ∈ I, are the unit commitment of the thermal and CC units
(variables uit), the energy allocated to the portfolio of bilateral
contracts by each thermal and CC units (variables bit), and the
optimal sale bid, expressed as a function of the previous first-
stage variables, which results in the second stage variables
pM,sit , the matched energy for scenario s.
A. Thermal and Combined Cycle units operation
The CC units represent a combination of combustion and
steam turbines within a power plant. Typically, a CC unit
consists of several combustion turbines (CTs) and an heat
recovery steam generator and steam turbine (HRSG/ST) set.
Based on the different combinations of CTs and HRSG/ST,
a CC unit can operate at multiple states or configurations.
The first two columns of Table I show the states of a CC
unit with a CT and an HRSG/ST considered in this study.
The operational rules of a typical CC unit were formulated
[14] with the help of the so-called pseudo units (PUs). As the
Table I
STATES OF THE CC UNIT AND ITS ASSOCIATED PSEUDO UNITS
CC unit with a CT and HRSG/ST
State Composition PU 1 uiPc(1) PU 2 uiPc(2)
0 0CT+0HRSG/ST off 0 off 0
1 1CT+0HRSG/ST on 1 off 0
2 1CT+1HRSG/ST off 0 on 1
thermal units, the PUs of each CC unit have their own unique
cost characteristics, real power generation limits, minimum on
time limits, etc., and can be viewed as a special set of non-
independent or coupling single thermal units. The on/off state
of these two PUs uniquely determined the state of the CC (see
columns 3 and 5 of Table I), and allowed (as it will be seen
later) a correct modelization of the operation of the state 0
without the need of an additional PU.
Let us define Pc, the set of PUs of the CC unit c ∈ C, and
P = ∪c∈CPc, the complete set of PUs. By Pc(j), we denote
the PU associated with the state j ∈ {1, 2} of the CC unit c.
Thus, U = T ∪P represents the complete set of units (thermal
and pseudo). The on/off state of each thermal and pseudo units
at period i can be represented by the first-stage binary variables
uit, t ∈ U . Columns 4 and 6 of Table I illustrate the relation
of the commitment binary variables of the PUs, uiPc(1) and
uiPc(2), with the state of the associated CC unit.
However, the operation of each thermal unit must guarantee
the minimum up (tont ) and down (t
off
t ) times. These conditions
are introduced through the following set of constraints [17]:
uit − u(i−1)t − eit + ait = 0 (a)
ait +
min{i+tofft ,|I|}∑
j=i
ejt ≤ 1 (b)
eit +
min{i+tont ,|I|}∑
j=i+1
ajt ≤ 1 (c)
uit, ait, eit∈{0, 1} ∩ Kt
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
∀i ∈ I
∀t ∈ T (1)
where Eq. (1a)-(1b) define the auxiliary binary variables ait
and eit to be ait = 1 iff u(i−1)t = 1 and uit = 0, and eit = 1
iff u(i−1)t = 0 and uit = 1. The minimum up (tont ) and down
(tofft ) times are guaranteed by Eq. (1b)-(1c). The set Kt stands
for the initial state of each unit. Analogously, each PU t ∈ P
has its own minimum up time, tont :
uit − u(i−1)t − eit + ait = 0 (a)
eit +
min{i+tont ,|I|}∑
j=i
ajt ≤ 1 (b)
uit, ait, eit∈{0, 1} ∩ Kt
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
∀i ∈ I
∀t ∈ P (2)
Each CC unit also has a minimum down time, i.e., once
shut down, the CC unit cannot be started up before tCc periods.
The following constraints formulate the minimum down time
condition for the CC units, expressed in terms of the binary
variables of the PU of Pc with the aid of the feasible transition
rules defined in Fig. 2:
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Figure 2. Feasible transitions of the CC unit with a CT and HRSG/ST
(
uiPc(1)+uiPc(2)
)−(u(i−1)Pc(1)+u(i−1)Pc(2))+(
aiPc(1)−eiPC(1)
)−(eiPc(2)−aiPC(2)) = 0
(
aiPc(1)−eiPc(2)
)
+
min{i+tCc ,|I|}∑
j=i
ejPc(1)−ajPc(2) ≤ 1
uit, ait, eit ∈ KCt
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
∀i ∈ I
∀c ∈ C
(3)
with KCt standing for conditions imposed by the initial state of
the CC unit. The feasible transitions rules impose additional
constraints to the operation of the PUs associated to the same
CC unit, c ∈ C. First, the PUs in Pc are mutually exclusive
(Eq. (4a)), i.e., only one of them can be committed at a given
period (a CC can only be in one state simultaneously). Second,
the change of the commitment of the PUs in Pc between
periods i and i + 1 are limited to the feasible transitions
depicted in Fig. 2. These feasible transitions impose that, if
the CC unit c is in state 0 at period i (uiPc(1)+uiPc(2) = 0), it
cannot be in state 2 at period i+1 (u(i+1)Pc(2) = 0) (Eq. (4b)).
Conversely, if uiPc(2) = 1, then u(i+1)Pc(1) + u(i+1)Pc(2) ≥ 1
(Eq. (4c)). The following set of constraints formulates the
specific operation rules of the CC units:∑
m∈Pc
uim ≤ 1 (a)
u(i+1)Pc(2) ≤ uiPc(1) + uiPc(2) (b)
uiPc(2) ≤ u(i+1)Pc(1) + u(i+1)Pc(2) (c)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
∀i ∈ I
∀c ∈ C (4)
B. Bilateral Contracts Constraint
Consider that the GenCo has agreed to physically provide
the energy amounts LBCij at hour i ∈ I of day D for each one
of the j ∈ BC bilateral contracts. This energy LBCij can be
provided by any programming unit U , both thermal and PUs:∑
t∈U
bit =
∑
j∈BC
LBCij (a)
bit ∈ [0, pt] ∀t ∈ U (b)
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ ∀i ∈ I (5)
where the total contribution of the committed unit t to the BC
covering at period i is represented by the variable bit.
C. Optimal bid function and equivalent matched energy con-
straints
The optimal bid function could be developed under the the
following assumptions, some of them being imposed by the
MIBEL’s rules: (a) The GenCo is a price-taker, i.e., the day-
ahead clearing price λDi does not depend on the GenCo’s
bidding; (b) The unit t (thermal or PU) has been committed;
(c) The unit t would bid its minimum generation output p
t
at
zero price (instrumental bid); (d) The total contribution of unit
t to the BC covering must be excluded from the bid; and (e)
The probability function of the clearing-price random variable
λDi has been discretized in a set of scenarios S with associated
clearing price λD,si and probability P
s, s ∈ S. By assuming the
quadratic thermal generation costs, CG(p) = cbt +cltp+c
q
t (p)2,
the benefits obtained from the day-ahead market as a function
of the matched energy pM,sit (the amount of energy that the
thermal unit t has to produce as a result of the market-
clearing mechanism) for a given dispatched BC energy bit,
under scenario s will be:
BD,sit (p
M,s
it , bit) = λ
D,s
i p
M,s
it −
[
CG(pM,sit +bit)−CG(bit)
]
= λD,si p
M,s
it +
−cltpM,sit −cqt (pM,sit )2−2cqtpM,sit bit (6)
If assumptions (a)-(d) hold true, then it can be shown (Th. 1
of [18]) that the function :
λB∗it (p
B
it, bit)=
{
0 if 0≤pBit≤ [pt−bit]+
2cqt (pBit+bit)+c
l
t if [pt−bit]+<pBit≤pt−bit
∀i ∈ I , ∀t ∈ U
with [a − b]+ = max{0, a − b}, is the optimal bid function
of unit t for the day-ahead market i in the sense that, for any
given value bit, if function λB∗it is bid, the matched energy
pM,sit corresponding to any scenario s with market price λ
D,s
i ,
maximizes the day-ahead benefit function BD,sit .
When bTit = 0 (the committed unit t does not contribute to
the BC covering), our problem reduces to the classical self-
commitment problem discussed by several authors [5], [6].
In this case, it is well known that the optimal-bid strategy
for a price-taker GenCo consists of an instrumental bid up
to the operational minimum limit, p
t
, and the rest of the
plant capacity at the marginal price, 2cqtpit + c
l
t. This optimal
policy corresponds to the particular case bit = 0 of the
generalized optimal-bid function λB∗it . The matched energy
for this particular case will be called the BC-free day-ahead
matched energy, and can be represented by pD,sit :
pD,sit ≡ pM,sit (0)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p
t
if p∗,sit ≤ pt
p∗,sit if p
∗,s
it ∈]pt, pt[
pt if p
∗,s
it ≥ pt
∀i ∈ I
∀t ∈ U
∀s ∈ S
(7)
with p∗,sit = (λ
D,s
i − clt)/2cqt , the unconstrained minimum of
the benefit function Eq. (6). pD,sit is a constant parameter of
the model for a fixed thermal t, period i, and scenario s, and
can be used to develop the expression of the optimal matched
energy pM,sit (bit) [18]:
pM,sit (bit, uit)=
{ [
pD,sit − bit
]+
if uit = 1
0 if uit = 0
∀i ∈ I
∀t ∈ U
∀s ∈ S
(8)
Fig. 3 represents the function pM,sit (bit, uit) (thick line and
dot). However, this non-differentiable expression cannot be
included in the optimization model as it is. To formulate
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an equivalent mixed-integer linear formulation, we introduced
the auxiliary binary zsit and continuous v
s
it variables (see
Fig 3). In this formulation, zsit = 1 whenever bit ≥ pD,sit
and zsit = 0 otherwise, while v
s
it will be always defined as
vsit =
[
bit − pD,sit
]+
. With the help of these auxiliary variables,
expression (8) can be transformed into the following equivalent
mixed-integer linear system (Prop. 2 [18]):
pM,sit = p
D,s
it uit + v
s
it − bit (a)
pD,sit (z
s
it+uit−1)≤bit (b)
bit≤pD,sit (1−zsit)+pt(zsit+uit−1) (c)
pD,sit (1−zsit)≥pM,sit (d)
pD,sit (1−zsit)≤pD,sit uit (e)
vsit≤(pt−pD,sit )(zsit+uit−1) (f)
pM,sit ∈ [0, pD,sit ] (g)
vsit ∈ [0, pt − pD,sit ] (h)
zsit∈{0, 1} (i)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
∀i ∈ I
∀t ∈ U
∀s ∈ S
(9)
The total generation output of thermal unit t at each time
period i and scenario s is given by:
psit = p
M,s
it + bit ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ U , ∀s ∈ S (10)
D. Objective function
The expected value of the benefit function B can be
expressed as:
EλD [B(u, a, e, p, p
M ;λD)] =∑
∀i∈I
∑
∀j∈BC
λBCij L
BC
ij (11)
−
∑
∀i∈I
∑
∀t∈T
[
cont eit + c
off
t ait + c
b
tuit
]
(12)
−
∑
∀i∈I
∑
∀c∈C
[
conPc(1)
(
eiPc(1)−aiPc(2)
)
+conPc(2)eiPc(2)
]
(13)
−
∑
∀i∈I
∑
∀c∈C
∑
∀t∈Pc
cbtuit (14)
+
∑
∀i∈I
∑
∀t∈U
∑
∀s∈S
P s
[
λD,si p
M,s
it −cltpsit−cqt (psit)2
]
(15)
The term (11) is constant and corresponds to the BC profit.
The term (12) is the on/off fixed cost of the unit commitment
of the thermal units. The CC’s start-up and fixed generation
costs are formulated in term (13) and (14). In this formulation,
as in [14], only start-up costs are associated to the PU, and
no cost is associated to the transition from state 2 to state 1.
Both terms (12), (13) and (14) are deterministics and does not
depend on the realization of the random variable λD. Finally,
expression (15) represents the expected value of the benefit
from the day-ahead market for thermal and CC units, where P s
is the probability of scenario s. The generation cost functions
of the PUs are modeled as quadratic functions as done in a
couple of earlier studies [14], [15]. All the functions appearing
in Eqs. (12) and (15) are linear except the generation costs in
Eq. (15), which are concave quadratic (cqt ≥ 0).
E. Final model
The final model developed in the previous sections is as
follows:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
maxEλD [B(u, a, e, p, pM;λD)]
s.t. :
Eq. (1) Thermal unit commitment const.
Eq. (2, 3, 4) CC unit commitment const.
Eq. (5) Bilateral contracts dispatching const.
Eq. (9) Optimal matched energy const.
Eq. (10) Definition of the total generation psit
(16)
The two-stage stochastic problem (16) corresponds to a mixed
concave quadratic maximization problem with linear con-
straints.
III. TEST AND RESULTS
The model (16) has been tested using real data of a
typical generation company and market prices for the Spanish
Peninsular Electricity System [16] and the results are reported
in this section. The day under study is Monday, May 05
2008, in the electricity market of mainland Spain. 3 bilateral
contracts, 4 thermal units, 2 combined cycle units with a CT
and a HRSG/ST and 24 hours of study were used in the tests.
The characteristics of the thermal and CC units and BCs are
shown in Table II, III and IV, respectively. The parameter st0t
stands for the number of hours the unit has been on (st0t > 0)
or off (st0t < 0) previous to the first optimization period. The
minimum off time for both CC units (parameter tCc in Eq. 3)
was set to 3 hours, and also both CC units was considered shut-
down for 3 hours previous to the first optimization period. The
model (16) has been implemented in AMPL [19] and solved
with CPLEX [20] (default options) using a SunFire X2200
with two dual core AMD Opteron 2222 processors at 3 GHz
and 32 Gb of RAM memory.
In order to test the two-stage stochastic model (16) a char-
acterization of the market price λD through a set of scenarios
is required, where each scenario λD,s = [λD,s1 , . . . , λ
D,s
24 ] is
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5Table II
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THERMAL UNITS
t cbt c
l
t c
q
t pt pt
e e/MWh e/MWh2 MW MW
1 151.08 40.37 0.015 160.0 350.0
2 554.21 36.50 0.023 250.0 563.2
3 327.02 28.85 0.036 160.0 370.7
4 197.93 36.91 0.020 160.0 364.1
t st0t c
on
t c
off
t t
on
t t
off
t
hr e e hr hr
1 +3 412.80 412.80 3 3
2 +3 803.75 803.75 3 3
3 -2 438.40 438.40 3 3
4 -1 419.20 419.20 3 3
Table III
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMBINED CYCLE UNITS
c Pc cbt clt cqt pt
e e/MWh e/MWh2 MW
1 5 151.08 50.37 0.023 160.0
1 6 224.21 32.50 0.035 250.0
2 7 163.11 55.58 0.019 90.0
2 8 245.32 31.10 0.022 220.0
c Pc pt st0t cont tont
MW hr e hr
1 5 350.0 –2 803.75 2
1 6 563.2 –2 412.80 2
2 7 350.0 –2 320.50 2
2 8 700.0 –2 510.83 2
composed by a set of 24 hourly market prices. A set of
25 scenarios has been used, obtained as the result of the
application of a scenario reduction algorithm [21] to the
complete set of history data available from June 2007 to the
day under study. A summary of the characteristics of the
optimization problem and its solution is shown in Table V.
The optimal unit commitment of thermal and CC units is
shown in Fig. 4. The three states or configurations of the
CC units are represented as white (state 0), gray (state 1,
Pc(1)) and black (state 2, Pc(2)) hourly blocks. Notice how
the operation of the CC units obey the minimum up time and
the feasible transition rules expressed by Eq. (2) and Eq. (4)
respectively. When started-up, both CC units stay in state 1
longer than the minimum on time tont = 2 before switching
to the state 2.
Table IV
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BILATERAL CONTRACTS
j LBCj=1...24 λ
BC
j=1...24
MW e/MWh
1 200 75
2 150 73
3 250 78
Table V
OPTIMIZATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY CASE
Constraints Real Binary E(Benefits) CPU
variables variables e s
31927 9915 5240 850.058 893
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Figure 4. The unit commitment of thermal and CC units.
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Figure 5. Management of the bilateral contracts (
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between thermal and combined cycle units.
Fig. 5 shows the aggregated economic dispatch of the three
BCs (600MWh) by the thermal (white bars) and the CC (black
bars) units. It can be observed that, depending on the period,
the portfolio of BC is covered exclusively by the thermal units
(periods 1,2,10,15,19 and 24), or by a combination of thermal
and CC units (the rest of the periods).
The optimal bid functions λB∗it for the thermal and CC units
are represented in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 respectively, where bi...k
represents the value of bit at the different periods i, and b∗
corresponds to the rest of periods not explicitly indicated. To
help the understanding of this graphics, let us analyze the
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Figure 7. Representation of the optimal bid function λB∗it (p
B
it, bit) of the
CC units.
most simple case, the thermal unit T4, which is committed all
the periods, except the first one. First, observe the piecewise
discontinuous thick line, with a first block going from 0 to
the minimum output p, and a second block between p and p,
with a slope equal to the marginal cost of the thermal unit
2cq4. Both blocks correspond, respectively, to the two blocks
defining the optimal bid function λB∗it . After the development
of Section II-C we know that this thick line represents the
optimal bid function only in those periods where bit = 0,
(periods i ∈ {2, 9, 11−14, 16, 18, 20−23} for the thermal unit
T4). Moreover, for those periods where bit > 0, the optimal
bid function corresponds to the part of the thick line between
the auxiliary second vertical axis shown in Fig. 6 located at bit,
and pt. In the case of the thermal unit T4, bi,4 = p4 = 160MW
for periods i ∈ {3− 8, 15}, bi,4 = 130MW for period i = 17
and bi,4 = 30MW for periods i ∈ {10, 19, 24}. Although
bi,4 ≤ p4 ∀i in the case of the thermal unit T4, this could
not be the case for other thermal units: see for instance the
optimal bid function of thermal unit T3, where bi,3 = 190MW
∀i ∈ {2−5, 15} and b22,3 = 221.5MW, both values above the
minimum generation p
3
= 160MW. The optimal bid functions
of the remaining thermal units of Fig. 6 can be interpreted in
a similar way.
Let us now focus our attention on the optimal bid functions
of the CC units (Fig. 7). First observe how each CC has two
different sets of optimal bid functions, depending on the state
of the CC unit at each period i. The CC unit 1 would send
the optimal bid functions CC1-P1(1) at periods 5, 6 and 7,
where this CC unit is in state 1 (gray blocks of Fig. 4), and
the optimal bid functions CC1-P1(2) at the rest of the periods
(black blocks of Fig. 4). The same happens with the second CC
unit, CC2. Please notice that the optimal bid function of each
state of the same CC unit has its own slope, which corresponds
to the marginal cost of each PU.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A two-stage stochastic mixed-quadratic programming prob-
lem has been proposed to decide the optimal unit commitment
and sale bid to the day-ahead market, and the optimal eco-
nomic dispatch of the bilateral contracts for all the thermal
and combined cycle units observing the MIBEL regulation.
The model was implemented and solved with commercial
optimization packages and tested with real data of a Spanish
generation company and market prices. The results of the
computational experiments show the validity of the presented
model and its applicability to real problems.
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